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Accomplishments
In this Section we detail accomplishments with respect to each of the objectives mentioned above.
Objective 1
Our work on secure RPC in WSNs focused on tools for the popular TinyOS programming environment. A major contribution was an extension of the nesC programming language, called SpartanRPC, that provides a secure RPC abstraction and an expressive and fine-grained security policy language. SpartanRPC allows multiple networks in distinct security domains to interact without resorting to other hardware intermediaries. Our system includes an asynchronous RPC abstraction based on nesC wiring constructs. The benefit of this approach is that experienced nesC programmers will readily understand the usage of novel SpartanRPC constructs. Furthermore, programmers can specify dynamic endpoints of wirings, to accommodate changes in network configurations.
RPC services are secured with authorization policies mediating access. These policies are written in an expressive language that supports distributed, decentralized specification and maintenance. Individual security domains are able to manage their own policy specifications. For network communications, our underlying protocols use public keys to support an open-world security model, where security domains do not need to share secrets a priori. Rather, authorization is established via signed credentials communicated over the air. Because public key signature verification is very costly in WSNs, our protocols also incorporate symmetric session key negotiations for efficient communications with authorized actors.
Performance overhead of this system was measured using a variety of metrics. The majority of computational costs are incurred during initial authorization periods between network nodes, when credentials are verified and session keys are computed. Following this short transient state (90 seconds to several minutes depending on network densities), normal network communications proceed with relatively little overhead. General impacts are summarized in Fig. 1 . To demonstrate memory overhead, we compare RAM and ROM bytes consumed in a simple client-serve test harness, implemented in "baseline" fashion with no security, and implemented using the SpartanRPC framework in a secure fashion. We also illustrate impact on maximum messaging rates, by comparing such rates in the baseline implementation with both insecure and secure RPC versions. The latter data shows that the most significant messaging overhead incurred by our system is from the security features, not the RPC abstraction provided in SpartanRPC. Due to resource constraints in WSNs, application efficiency is extremely important. At the same time, complex, distributed algorithms are typical application components. We proposed program specialization, aka staged programming, as a technique to address both these issues. In a staged programming language, code is treated as a datatype, and programs can be dynamically generated and subsequently executed. We envisioned that a staged programming language could be executed on a high-powered WSN network "hub" device, that could dynamically generate specialized, efficient WSN node programs based on conditions. A particular novelty of our approach was a focus on type safety, to ensure that type safe hub programs are guaranteed to generate type safe node programs. We call this cross-stage type safety This is especially important in case hubs are remote and not accessible by operators who could bug-fix type errors in generated code. Although a variety of staged programming languages exist, they have not been designed with crossstage type safety, or in an execution model that reflects WSN hardware architecture. Thus, a number of foundational issues existed. We addressed these issues in the M L language, which combined a core-ML language with staging features. Our main result was a formal proof of cross-stage type safety for M L , though we resolved a variety of practical language design issues.
On this foundation, we next developed a practical staged language for developing real WSN applications. This language, called Scalaness/nesT, extends Scala with staging features for executing programs on hubs, that generate type-safe nesC programs for subsequent deployment to WSN nodes. The language compilation and execution model is described in Fig. 2 . Of particular note here is the fact that cross-stage type safety of Scalaness source code ensures that compiled bytecode can be deployed to, and run on, hubs without fear of generating ill-typed specialized WSN node programs.
To explore and demonstrate practical applications of Scalaness/nesT, especially in a security setting, we re-implemented the SpartanRPC system in a staged style. In particular, we offloaded credential verification and symmetric key computations to a Scalaness program on a hub, that generates specialized node programs with embedded session keys for secured network communications. This system is illustrated in Fig. 4 . A staged approach to SpartanRPC communications has a significant effect on RAM and ROM usage, as summarized in Fig. 3 . We compared three software versions of a client-server application: one with no security mechanisms in place, one with unstaged SpartanRPC protocols in place, and one generated by Scalaness evaluation in our staged version of the SpartanRPC protocol. The "Savings" in this figure are the percent reduction from unstaged to staged secure implementation, and these numbers show the potential for saving both RAM and ROM space is quite significant using staging. This is especially important, since it changes the delicate balance between the security and language abstraction benefits of SpartanRPC, and associated implementation overhead.
Objective 3
Wireless Sensor Networks typically produce time-series data that is frequently intended for the public domain. But even if data is shared publicly, it is still important to maintain metadata, especially provenance, for proper understanding and attribution of data sources. Most metadata schemes for environmental data are based on imposed structure and annotations, e.g. XML formats. However, this scheme is brittle, due to typical practices of domain scientists, who are mainly interested in data, who perform analysis and spreadsheets, and who are likely to "throw away the (metadata) wrapper". Thus, we proposed a scheme for embedding identifiers directly in time series data, and associating those identifiers with web-accessible provenance information. This scheme is called self-identifying data. Self-identifying data leverages noise in sensor readings, in a manner similar to existing watermarking techniques. To anticipate manipulations of data common in scientific practice, the scheme is robust to data sampling, reordering, and truncation. Although the scheme is not secure, in the sense that it can be easily subverted by a malicious actor, it is rather intended to support "Fair-Use" data sharing policies between 
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Figure 6: Predicted and observed probability of recovering provenance mark.
well-intentioned actors. Support for Fair Use policies is especially important, since concerns about proper attribution is one of the most common barriers to data sharing. Our technique is illustrated in Fig. 5 . In each datapoint, some range of least significant bits is reserved for metadata embedding-the size of this range is dependent on the accuracy and precision of sensor readings. More significant bits are left untouched. Bits reserved for metadata are used to encode a fragment of the embedded provenance identifiers, while the parameter and mark check bits are used to determine fragment ordering and validity for reconstructing complete marks. Because each marked datapoint contains only a fragment of the complete provenance identifier, identifier reconstruction requires multiple datapoints.
In Fig. 6 , we show both a combinatorial prediction and empirical observations of the probability of recovering a provenance identifier given a particular data sample size. Empirical observations for several datasets are shown. In summary, our results illustrate that a sample of 30-40 distinct datapoints are adequate for near 100% probability of provenance identifier recovery. In addition to this analysis, we have illustrated practical application of our scheme in a publicly available dataset generated by environmental monitoring networks. This dataset is paired with a web tool that automatically extracts provenance identifiers from datasets, and redirects to webpages with provenance information.
